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THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE RELATION.

A FOUR-FOLD CONSPECTUS.

"The relation *between* subject and object should properly be called the subjective and objective relation."—*Reliques of Constance Naden*.

I. DUALISM.

IN the course of my reading, some years ago, I remember being struck with an admission on the part of a confessed dualist, the present occupant of the chair of logic in the University of Glasgow. The passage, which is as follows, occurs in a criticism of the views of the late Prof. J. H. Green, of Oxford.

"It may be said,—it seems to be assumed,—that the existence of a distinguishing self-consciousness is needed for the subsistence of the object perceived—for example, force in space. Now, I do not say that the mode of the subsistence of force that passes out of my perception is easily explicable, or explicable at all. Here, possibly, we may be face to face with the mystery—the insoluble mystery—of being." ("Knowing and Being," by Professor Veitch, LL.D. Blackwoods, 1889, p. 221.)

It seems to me that this admission involves much more than at first sight appears. Taken in connexion with the qualifications which immediately follow, it is the very key-note of *modern* dualism—a notable advance indeed upon the old-fashioned doctrine, though dualism still.

"But I may have evidence," continues the writer, "from experience—inferential proof—that the force or object does exist in some way or other, in a sphere transcending my perception. This, in fact, is the lesson of science in its simplest form." (*Ibid.*)

These are not the only passages of the same work in which such arguments are to be found. Besides "the insensible constituents

of the world in the form of atom, ether, corpuscle, along with, and involved in, the sensible," which, we are told, "are not and never can become objects of perception, that is, phenomena in the proper sense of the term," there are the varied relationships into which perceived objects may enter from time to time, there is (p. 72) "a nerve-current preceding actual or conscious sensation and perception by us, of which, at the moment, we are wholly unconscious," and still further, and, "beyond the organism or bodily sphere there are agencies in space which precede, condition, so far determine, our actual sensation or perception, of which, however, we have neither sensation nor perception."

And because all this cumulative evidence goes, apparently, to prove that, beyond the individual organism, or at least on its outermost confines, there exists a group of facts which cannot be regarded as egoistically "constituted," the conclusion is sought to be reached that the order of nature is dualistic. Yet, as we have seen, the argument halts a little at one stage. "I do not say," is the expression of Professor Veitch regarding one portion of its basis, that it is "easily explicable or explicable at all." Ethereal vibrations and undulations *preceding* perception—anticipating the percipient as it were, and therefore surely independent of him, are plain enough from the standpoint of dualism. What is *about to pass into perception* is granted, but the subsistence of that which *passes out of perception* is perhaps inexplicable! Upon what principle is this theory based? Surely upon one itself inexplicable, were it not that a further quotation shows confusion of thought to be at the root of the matter. The words italicised point clearly enough to oscillation in the viewpoint.

"We distinguish ourselves from the object or percept. . . . Are we entitled on this ground to say that its whole reality is identical with its perceived reality? That it may not subsist apart from the time of our perception, *either as it is, or in some form capable again of appearing to us as an object, even an object similar to what we now perceive?*" (*Ibid.* p. 200.)

Professor Veitch combats the Oxford Professor's contention that the ego of consciousness "constitutes" nature, or the external world. But he seems reluctantly to admit that once anything ex-

ternal has passed through consciousness, e. g. experienced force, the said force is never the same again as it was before. *A B C . . .* successively passing through the point of consciousness are normal and intelligible up to that point, but once they have emerged from it their subsistence becomes "not easily explicable if explicable at all," hints, in fact, of "the mystery—the insoluble mystery of being."

Now, the ego is either (in Professor Green's sense) constitutive or it is not constitutive. It matters little, at this stage, in what special sense the ego is regarded. Either the former or the latter alternative must, however, be true of it. If the former—if it *is* constitutive—then it is surely capable, if not of accounting for succeeding phenomena, in which case the dualistic argument fails. If the latter—if the ego is *not* constitutive,—then it influences neither preceding nor succeeding entities, and there is nothing "inexplicable" at all!

This advanced view on the part of the author of "Knowing and Being" does not, however, characterise him throughout. Along with it, he professes thorough-paced dualism of the older type—and answers the question "Why does the intelligence make different relations?" with the characteristic statement: "On no reasonable ground but on that of a known order, which it does not create, but which informs and illumines it" (p. 141). With him, the perceived object in the moment of perception is, of course, related to the subject, but he insists repeatedly that this relationship may be but temporary and accidental, and, above all, that even to admit that an object is so "constituted" is not to dogmatise as to the *sole being* of that object. Significant indeed, are expressions such as the following: "a conscious or spiritual subject, continuous in time, exercising a synthesis on an order of facts, for purposes of knowledge," and this again, "the singular, indivisible unity of the subject, one in the midst of the passing terms" (p. 235-236).

The principal point, however, to be noted here is, that, at the same stage of the argument does the selfsame difficulty present itself to dualist (as represented by Professor Veitch) and to monist (as represented by Professor Green) alike. What the resource of

transcendental monism is, we have yet to consider. But the *modern* dualist finds himself landed in difficulties at precisely the same point. To the dualist it is, of course, of no moment—it is rather a distinct advantage—that the subject should be shown to rise superior to the series of contemplated objects—though the same admission is really fatal to monism. But—and here lies the *crux* of dualism—although it is not only permissible, but essential to this view to regard objective facts as, somehow, existent prior to the instant of perception, it is no less fatal to it to be compelled to define, either (a) the exact mode of their subsistence (e. g., in the case of force) when the selfsame time has passed, and the object, once in the field of perception, has quitted it, or, (b) the qualifying effect of the subject (for it must surely amount to something) upon such an object. If as *stimulus* such an object existed prior to perception, must it not as stimulus subsist afterwards? which would be an awkward conclusion. The explanation of all this probably is that modern dualism, being plain dualism no longer, is compelled to “hedge” and finds itself in difficulties accordingly. After all, the main difficulty is not wholly novel. “Teacher,” inquired a latter-day pupil, watching his preceptor setting a sum on the blackboard, “Teacher, where do the figures go to when you rub them out?”

It is all very well to appeal to “science” for an argument against Professor Green’s position, and to point out that, say, water, cannot be said to be “constituted”—at least, in its totality—in the moment of perception, seeing that the “surface properties” of clearness, fluidity, etc., which alone are then patent, do not “make up” the object in its entirety—the insensible constituents—oxygen and hydrogen (which, as dualism triumphantly asserts, go to make the water *what it is*, and without which it *would not have been at all*)—being altogether omitted. This is so far telling, though the weak point of the argument is not difficult of discovery. But, when it is sought to be impressed upon us that the “stimulus” of light and sound sensation similarly precedes, necessarily, the sensation itself, and dualistic capital is sought to be made out of the statement, the ground is not so certain. The field is shifted from that of “gathered knowledge” to that of purely subjective hypothesis. It must

be remembered that the cue of dualism does not consist in showing that perception is a complicated process. No one denies *that*. Its very foundation, on the other hand, is shaken if it cannot be demonstrated that *throughout* the cosmos a boundary line exists, capable of verification everywhere and at all times. Otherwise dualism perishes. This separation must be drawn throughout the realm of facts, verifiable facts only. And that is an impossibility, if for this reason alone, that, on the ground of physics, a subjective-objective separation throughout would lead to atomic divisibility, and the region of hypothesis is invaded, where your dividing-line is drawn according to the dictates of fancy alone.

Here is a subject-object relation admittedly fortuitous and temporary.

II. TRANSCENDENTAL MONISM.

This section need not be a lengthy one, if for this reason alone, that the chief difficulty of advanced dualism upon which we have just dwelt, is the opportunity of the first stage of monism.

Since the time of Hume, when the permanent conscious subject was dispensed with, in favor of a "string of impressions illegitimately bound together in a series," the apparent need of philosophy was a "something," in which the series of impressions, as a series, might inhere. That this "something" could not well be the individual consciousness, as a subject, was sufficiently evident to the monists. For, once place the individual consciousness in the needed position of superiority over, or aloofness from, the impressional series, in order that it may not only reflect,—mirror-like,—the terms of the passing series, but, at the same time, synthesise them into a connected whole, and you at the same time admit a dualism.

There was, indeed, a twofold difficulty, arising from timal exigencies. There was (1) the objection, urged by dualism, that *prior* to the conscious impression there was a natural process—certainly not subjective—say of undulation or vibration of ether, without which sensation could not possibly happen. Time being a factor in the situation, how could the conclusion be avoided that here was an

apparently unconnected entity, separate from consciousness? And then (2) there was the added difficulty, that no passage of the several impressions *a, b, c . . .* through the point of consciousness, could give more than what the several impressions individually were—a record of each successive impression, but no record of the gathered synthesis. The twenty-four hours might pass over the dial, but the faculty was wanting to sum up the result into the total of one day.

This pure thinking subject, “other than the events, and not passing with them,” must evidently, if it is to be equal to the occasion, be itself timeless,—“imposing, but not submitting to, the conditions of time and space.” Hence the origination of the Eternal Consciousness of the late Professor Green. “The analogy of the perceiving consciousness is transferred to the universe or universe-consciousness, and, as perceived, reality is simply relation in time by a subject out of time; so is all the reality of the universe. There is a (or one) consciousness, or self-distinguishing subject, for which the relations or facts that form the object of our gradually attained knowledge already and eternally exist. . . . This is the eternally complete consciousness.”

This is what has been called the method of transcendental abstractionalism, for besides the importation into the matter of a transcendental ego—subject and object in itself, as holding the universe fact in solution—the operation has been facilitated by what may be called the abstractionalist view of the individual self. In a word, thought, and not the thinker, is dwelt upon,—consciousness, and not the conscious subject. In this way it is easy to pass to the position of holding this transcendental self to be real—in fact, the only reality—instead of, as with Kant, a logical abstraction, and, finally, to its elevation to a theistic level as a substitute for the God of popular theology. As Professor Veitch puts Green’s position (“Knowing and Being,” p. 30).

“It is as we relate, according to the relations of the eternal consciousness, that we reach the truth of things. This is an infinite fount, or, better, reservoir, of timeless relations, which pours life into the human consciousness in time. It is the condition, not only of knowledge, but the creator of reality.”

This Neo-Kantian theory, as it has been called, differs from the ordinary subject-object presentation of dualism most markedly in the following respect. It seeks to blend percepts with concepts—or, rather, to recognise nothing in the former which is not in the latter. It seeks to include all outward, or so-called external, reality within the domain of thought. Thought being thus supreme over the objective, the thinking subject disappears in the same mist, and the abstraction of the infinite consciousness alone remains. This is monism, indeed,—of a kind.

In this aspect, the subject-object relation altogether disappears by fusion in a transcendental entity, which, so far from preserving the relation within itself, is only a means of its obliteration.

III. MONISTIC POSITIVISM.

This view is ably expounded by Dr. Paul Carus in his works "Fundamental Problems," "The Soul of Man," etc., (The Open Court Publishing Co.), and in the pages of *The Open Court* and *The Monist*. In it we find a presentation of the subject-object relation radically different from either of the foregoing. But Dr. Carus can best describe his own method.

"Positive philosophy rejects all kinds of postulates, and starts from the positive data of experience. The data of experience are the several states of our consciousness. The elements of our states of consciousness are sensory impressions. A sensory impression, fully realised in consciousness, is a sensation. Sensations become percepts; many percepts of the same kind become concepts. Thus all the objects of our surroundings are mirrored in their relation toward us, and among themselves, in the living substance of our brain" ("Soul of Man," pp. 374-375).

Now, with a reservation to be afterwards noted, this is much more than an initial step in the right direction. The dualism which we have examined professed much the same intentions to start with, but did not keep its promise—its system of research being vitiated, at the very outset, by a foregone conclusion—the separation, namely, of subject from object. This separation is implicit, if not explicit in its proposal ("Knowing and Being," Intro. p. 1) to begin with the twofold questions to which its philosophy is to supply the answers—viz. "What do I know?" and "What is?" In the shaping of these queries a separation is taken for granted, at the very thresh-

hold of inquiry, between knowing and being. How has it been ascertained, at this stage, that knowing and being are different spheres? Why, at the outset, is it assumed that that which exists so divides itself? But we turn to Dr. Carus. Take the following extracts as samples :

1) "All elements of objective reality are inseparably united with the corresponding elements of subjective reality, and the latter are those facts which under special conditions, and in special combinations, unite into feelings" ("Soul of Man," p. 7).

2) "Feelings must be considered as a complex of certain elements which we call 'the elements of feeling'" (*Ibid.*, p. 6).

3) "The world is as it is, one indivisible whole. All its objective reality is throughout combined with subjective reality. The objective reality we call matter, and its activity, motions. The subjective reality we call elements of feeling; and the compounds resulting therefrom are actual feelings and consciousness" (*Ibid.*, p. 10).

4) "If neither matter nor motion is to be considered the one as the basis of the other, reality, as it exists in itself, may be conceived as a great interacting something, in which the effects of all the surrounding parts upon one special part, an atom or a monad, in so far as this part is concerned, appear as what we have defined as an element of feeling; while the effects of this special part, of every atom or monad, upon the rest, in so far as the totality is concerned, appear as motion" (*Ibid.*, p. 14).

5) "The whole domain of mind-activity (i. e. of the representativeness of feelings) is called subjective; while the totality of all facts that are represented in the mind is called objective. . . . Subjective existence constantly draws upon objective existence. . . . We distinguish between our body and external facts; but the boundary between both provinces is not distinct. There is constantly an exchange of substance taking place, proving that our body is in kind not different from the substance of which external facts consist. It must be regarded as a group of the same kind as external facts, existing in a constant interaction with, and among, the external facts. In other words, the body of the thinking subject is an object in the objective world" (*Ibid.*, p. 25).

6) "The data of knowledge are not mere subjective states, they are relations between subject and object. Neither the subject is given, nor the object; but an interaction between subject and object. From this interaction we derive by a very complicated process of abstraction both concepts, the subject as well as the object. It is true that the subjective world of feelings, and of representative feeling, is very different from the objective world of things. Nevertheless they are one. The subject, together with all objects, forms one inseparable whole of subject-object-ness" (*Ibid.*, p. 36).

Should the above brief conspectus of quotation fail fairly to present Dr. Caruſ's philosophical view-point, it must be remembered that this paper is only concerned with the subject-object relation, and only with such part of each reviewed system as if concerned with the said relation. Of course, as a vital point in every philosophical system the treatment of this portion fairly indicates the drift of the whole. Only it must not—this partial survey—be mistaken for a complete exposition. Considerations of space alone would prevent any such attempt.

Monistic positivism shows no lack of logical thoroughness. It is distinguished by much acumen, and, from its constant consultation of physical data, is readily verifiable, from time to time, by the student. Whether or not it is a completely successful *rationale* of the subject-object relation, within the limits of a consistent monism, is another matter. Probably its author would be the first to deprecate its being classed as final, or as not amenable to correction. This correction, however, it is not always easy to make, or even to suggest. It is proverbially difficult to alter successfully another person's work, and the difficulty is greater when the theme involved is one of the vexed problems of philosophy. There is the risk, again, of misunderstanding the terminology employed, even by a writer so precise and accurate as Dr. Carus. But it may be allowable to state briefly some of the points in respect of which monistic positivism, in regard to the matter now at issue, seems to fall short of a true unification.

Let us look again at the above quotation (p. 36), "Neither the subject is given, nor the object; but an interaction between subject and object." If by this is meant that the sensation, say of color, is the result of an interaction between vibratory ether and the optic nerve, the statement is correct. But how about the "projection" of this into the objective world, concerning which Dr. Carus treats ("Soul of Man," p. 30). The projection in question is comprehensible enough in the case of the illustration there given—a printed page, which, as a given fact, is the sense-impression of a white rectangle covered with little black characters, and, as the corresponding inferred fact, a sheet of paper. Is a colored surface, then, the cor-

responding inferred fact of the simple color which is the given fact? Be this as it may, the same objection, urged by dualism against Professor Green, will avail against monistic positivism. For "the interaction" is not everything. There is something which precedes it in time. There is the ethereal vibration which anticipates consciousness, sensation, perception,—which necessarily precedes all this. Now, what precisely *is* this vibration? Subjective? Then, to quote Dr. Carus ("Soul of Man, p. 27), "The elements of the subjective world are features that we must suppose to be inseparably united with the elements of the objective world, which are represented in our mind as motions." But this vibration, prior to sensation, is not represented in any mind. Is it objective? Then, again, "All elements of objective reality are inseparably united with the corresponding elements of subjective reality" ("Soul of Man," p. 7). But the vibration in question is not yet united with any subjective reality, or element of such, therefore it cannot be itself objective, or an element of objective reality. And, as it cannot be an "interaction" between subject and object, seeing that no interaction has yet taken place, what can it be?

And the question goes deeper still.

"The presence of the elements of feeling must be supposed to be an intrinsic property of the objective world" ("Soul of Man," p. 27). But at what stage? For we read (p. 26), that the subjective world is "transient"; the objective, "eternal, indestructible." Thus the conclusion is irresistible that, until such time as the conditions of development of subjective feelings arise—until potentiality develops into actuality, the objective exists without any subjective counterpart. As the objective cannot be said to form an interaction with its own potentialities, or "intrinsic properties," how can we say, again, that neither the subject is given, nor the object, but an interaction between them?

Further, it is not plain what *rationale* Dr. Carus gives regarding the mode of the subsistence of force, passing out of perception. All is clear so long as a subject is ready to form an "interaction" with the objective, but nothing seems to be provided for the contin-

gency of an entity—objective or otherwise—either *preceding* or *succeeding* the subjective in time.

Let us examine another passage—italicising some notable words :

“Truth in one sense is objective ; it represents objects, or their relations, conceived in their objectivity, in their independence, of the subject. This means that the representation of certain objective states will, under like conditions, agree with *the experiences of all subjects, i. e. of all feeling beings* having the same channels of information.” (“Soul of Man,” pp. 41-42.)

How are “the experiences of all subjects, i. e. of all feeling beings,” to be arrived at ? Are not all feeling beings—other than self—upon the same objective level to me as other objects ? If so, how can such “ejects,” as are here referred to, compare with my own proper subject-object experiences ?

Perhaps it is owing to an imperfect understanding on the present writer’s part, of the system of monistic positivism, but the following is surely irreconcilable with the severity of monism.

“Mind, or the representation of facts in feeling substance, is the creation of a new and a spiritual realm, above the facts of material existence. By spiritual we understand feelings that are representative ; and we say that it is a new creation, because it does not exist in the isolated facts of the world. It is formed under certain conditions. It rises from certain combinations of facts ; being built upon those facts which produce, in their coöperation, the subjective state of feeling.” (“Soul of Man,” p. 42.)

If there exist isolated facts, their existence *plus* a new and spiritual realm, or new creation, contradicts the statement, already quoted, that “the world is. . . one indivisible whole.” No combination of already existing facts can make anything properly “new.” Nothing can issue, from thus ringing the changes, which was not there before at least potentially, and the development of potentiality into actuality, though it may involve the novel, does not, in a philosophical sense, imply the *new*.

All this, as it seems to the present writer, is the result of an erroneous method of inquiry. A philosophical inquiry into the precise nature of the subject-object relation should start from the individual, personal consciousness tracing, step by step, how much

this includes, and, only when this has been ascertained, should the search be prolonged,—if it is to be prolonged,—into other fields. It seems, in monistic positivism, as if this rule were not adhered to; the testimony of the individual, personal consciousness is indeed appealed to, but only incidentally, and the line of research is diverted without notice, and, as if the two methods were one and the same, into the region of experimental physics. A subjective inquiry, which alone can inform of the subject-object relation, is shifted for purely objective exploration. Now, it is idle to search for the subjective where it does not reside, and in the exploration of nerve and tissue for the *rationale* of subject-object relation the experimenter is dealing with the object alone, *plus*, of course, *his own* subjectivity, which, in this instance, is beside the mark. In other words, objectivity (not ejectivity or inferred thoughts of “other thinking beings,” all of whose thoughts are on an entirely distinct level), coupled with my own, proper subjectivity, gives the relation sought. But in objectivity alone, or coupled with inferred thoughts of “other thinking beings,”—that is ejectivity,—the junction, say in brain localisation and nerve differentiation, is nowhere to be found. The desired relation, the only true subject-object relation—must be found at first hand.

In monistic positivism the subject-object relation is presented in a clearer and more consistent light than by either of the former systems. But as, to a certain extent, the relation is represented as obtaining in a potential form, the basis, to that extent, is insufficient.

IV. AUTO-MONISM.

Now, does it not seem after our brief review of the foregoing systems, as if, in connexion with the subject-object relation, something curiously similar is lacking in all? Dualism halts at the stage when force, passing out of perception, has nothing “easily explicable, if explicable at all,” wherein to subsist. This difficulty is attempted to be met, in transcendental monism, by the expedient of handing over the force in question to a consciousness, which turns out to be not properly egoistic at all, but common to all the individuals of the human race—thus slurring over the individual subject

altogether. Monistic positivism again has need of something wherein more than the mere potentiality of subject-object interaction may reside ; wherein, again, to unite the, apparently varying, individual "centres of representations" into a veritable cosmical ego, accounting, in itself, for all, apparent, timal discrepancies.

These *lacunæ* are filled by auto-monism. But I use words far clearer than my own to express this truth of truths.

"What we know as the external world is composed of colors, sounds, tastes, touches, and odors ; and since these can have no existence prior to their birth in the sensory ganglia, we see clearly that every man is the maker of his own cosmos. It comes into embryonic existence with his very first gleam of conscious life, and develops with his development, as he gradually learns to combine its lights and shades into symbols of form, size, and distance, and to indue its varying tones with relation and significance ; it becomes less vivid with his decline, and, at last, dies forever with his death. As soon as the perceptive organs have laid a foundation for memory and comparison, the present is supplemented and explained by, the past ; and the union of the two renders possible a new cosmos of emotion and intellect, which obeys the same organic laws of growth and decay." ("Further Reliques of Constance Naden," London, Bickers, pp. 120-121.)

This is the one side of the binomy ; take this in connexion with the other side as follows, and the *rationale* of auto-monism (Hylo-Idealism) is evident at once.

In answer to the question "What is the true starting-point of philosophy," Miss Naden writes :

"This question need not detain us long. . . . For, if subject and object be indissolubly one, the simplest unit from which we can start must be the ego in its entirety ; that is, the universe as felt and known." ("Reliques," p. 152.)

And again :

"For the philosopher who deals with the universe as a synthesis, the self, or ego, is that same synthesis, including all the various relationships of self and not-self which can be set up in thought." (*Ibid.*, p. 154.)

In a notice of the essays of Miss Naden, from which the above extracts are taken, contained in *The Open Court* (Feb. 11, 1892, No. 233, p. 3142) the following passage occurs :

" . . . to argue from the identity of the cosmos to the identification of the cosmos with the ego, as Miss Naden does . . . appears to us unreasonable."

Well, the argument is simply a prolongation of the assurance

of self-consciousness through the limits of the universe. The dividing line, upon which monistic positivism so strongly insists—say between given and inferred facts—does not militate against the conclusion arrived at, when it is considered that this line, so far from implying virtual separation, only gives us units isolated in thought. The synthesis is the true unit—being the only unit which does not imply anything else, which every *fractional* unit of the universe-synthesis does.

Observe how auto-monism supplies the gaps of the systems already treated of :

1) The need of “something” in which a percept, say force, may subsist when passing out of consciousness, is a mere begging of the question in favor of the separation of subject and object. How do I know that the force in question is a thing “outside” myself proper? Dualism indeed tells me regarding it, “This force is opposed to me in every way, to my will, to my muscular effort, to all my power. It is beyond me in space—in opposition to my personality. It is as distinctly something not belonging to me as anything that can be conceived.” But the self here—the *I*—is that of the limited bodily organism, part and parcel, however, all the same of that which it experiences. Otherwise how is it that dualism itself finds its mind clouded with a doubt? As we have seen, it cannot trust this force, though “not belonging to me” out of sight for an instant after passing out of its perception.

2) Similarly transcendental monism is puzzled because it cannot find something “other than the events and not passing with them,” unless it is permitted to erect a timeless consciousness to hold the events in solution. Well, the required consciousness need not be sought for far away—since an egoistic, cosmical synthesis includes both it and the events. The dividing line is only set up in thought.

3) The supplementing of monistic positivism is more complicated, but may be expressed thus : (α) As we understand Dr. Carus, the elements of feeling, being at least potentially present in the objective world, such may at any time develop into the subject. There is a timal difficulty here again. Inasmuch as, at all events, the be-

fore and after of this development of potentiality have to be reckoned with. A time when developed subjectivity faces objectivity has to be defined apart from a time when it did not. Here again is an *impasse*. What factor introduced causes this change? Auto-monism, identifying subject and object by including them in a synthesis, whereby the relation between them is only set up in thought, has no such difficulties to face. Subject and object are coterminous, neither before nor after the other, now and always. Further, (*b*) the auto-monistic synthesis is the only universal one, as no outside world of things can possibly differ from the inside representation—there being no outside possible for the auto-monistic consciousness. Other selves are not outside; they, with their respective “ejects,” are part of my individual self. No appulse, or outside stimulus, is really thinkable, as external. It is part of the cosmos which, spider-like, I spin from my internal self. And, when I image such externality, I but create it.

To put the foregoing in a nut-shell. The inexpugnable *I* of consciousness, guaranteed to us by the necessity of thought, is, in the systems of dualism and transcendental monism, to be found *in part only* of the universe; with the monistic positivist this *I* (the creation of circumstance and groupings) is *anywhere* in the universe. Auto-monism reveals the self-same *I* as *everywhere* in the universe.

The theories and concepts of modern physics are a budget of paradoxes *minus* a something in which they may consistently inhere. Hume's need of an individual and simple something, as a link between isolated impressions, is also a latter-day need. An atomic theory, with the subject *contra* object theory prolonged into it, is a tissue of contradictions. The push and pull of particles flatly contradicts the axiom that nothing can move, except in the place where it is. The *stimulus* theory of vibration needs a similar stimulus behind, and stimuli behind that again, in endless regress, if it is to advance a step beyond the purely hypothetical—“a convenient representation of the unknown.” All this resolves at once on the “open sesame!” of auto-monism. Atom, vibration, undulation, mutual attraction—all these *are not*, save as I shape them, and, in the last recess of philosophy, as in the extreme limit of physics, *I*

am, and there is none else. "The cosmic systole and diastole are one with the pulsing throb of my own egoity."

But, apart from the hypothetical bases of physics, there is to be found in its elementary text-books, a group of what may be termed sub-surface facts—totally irreconcilable with any other *rationale* than an auto-monistic one. As they are perfectly familiar to the ordinary student, to mention them will suffice. There is the inversion of the retinal image, which, notwithstanding Kepler's *rationale*, and some more recent explanations, would be perfectly inexplicable—as much so as a thing being and not being at the same time—did we not recognise that the thing seen is *as it is seen*, and not otherwise, and that any subsequent positing of it, as existing differently, is only a secondary, not a primary, process. That the one is object, the other, as it were, "eject," or, to put it still more plainly, that the contradictory image stands in the same category as the imagined "difficulty." Then there is the "projection," as it is called, of subjective facts into the so-called "external" world. Were this projection an actual primary fact, and not a secondary inference, no ingenuity could prevent the conclusion, that the thing, wherever or whatever it is, exists doubly; first, as it exists internally, and, second, as it is projected externally—nor could the difficulty be got over by the use of such metaphors as the substance and its shadow or reflexion. In a philosophical sense, the shadow is as veritable an existence as the substance, both being *real*. But "internal" and "external" signifying the same in auto-monism, no difficulty exists. The use of these terms should be carefully defined. In the crude sense of dualism, "internal and external" are fictions responsible for most, if not all, of the "blind alleys" of modern physics. Their existence as stumbling blocks should, and doubtless will, pave the way for a theory which disposes of them by reduction of all such ideas to their rational level. If the "outside," or objective, world of things really existed, fronting the percipient, would not the rods and cones of the bacillary layer of the retina—those prime factors of vision—be directed, like a series of telescopes, *towards* this supposed object? As a matter of fact, they point quite the other way, viz., downwards and backwards! All retinal impressions are "referred"

to a position vertically opposite to the point of irritation—vertically opposite, and outside the body. Why is this? Is it because they really exist there, externally? Scarcely, except in thought,—otherwise the *phosphène*, a luminous image produced by pressure on the eyeball, and similarly referred to an outside position, exists there also. And if not in the latter case, why not? The very hornbooks of physical science abound in these puzzles, born of the subject *contra* object delusion, and to be solved only by means of auto-monistic reasoning.

In this system, in contrast with all of the foregoing aspects, the subject-object relation is neither accidental nor temporary, but is permanent and universal. The proper aspect of relational terms is preserved, not obliterated. The aspect is always that of actuality—never of mere potentiality—each term of the relation being coterminous. The unity of the terms is guaranteed by their interdependence upon each other, the object implying the subject, and *vice versa*. And the relational unity, being internal, is complete, any external relationship of the auto-cosm being impossible in thought.

G. M. McCRIE.